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Jean Louis Rallu 
1 
Abstract 
Selective abortion of female embryos causes abnormal sex ratios at birth that will result 
in imbalances on the marriage market. However, it is well-known that varying cohort 
size in the frame of different mean ages at marriage for males and females also causes 
imbalances. In the case of Korea, both phenomenons are present : SRB of 115 in 1990-
1995 and rapid fertility decline from the early 1960s, with TFR fluctuating below 
replacement level since 1983 and reaching 1.16 in 2004. This note assesses the relative 
roles of SRB and cohort size on the marriage market and the adjustments that can 
happen thru age gap between spouses. 
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1. Introduction 
The increase in sex ratio at birth is a concern in several Asian countries: China, Taiwan, 
India and Bangladesh, not only for its long-term consequences on marriage market and 
population reproduction, but also in itself as it translates a general attitude towards 
gender roles and women empowerment. From a strictly demographic (mathematical) 
viewpoint, it is the cause of sex imbalances on the marriage market. But, it is not the 
only cause. It is well known that, due to age gap between spouses, variations in cohort 
size due to wars, epidemics, subsequent recoveries, the fertility transition, baby booms 
and busts, have also an important role on the sex ratio of marriageable ages (Bergstrom 
and Lam, Fraboni and Billari, McDonald, Ni Bhrolchain). Although selective abortion 
of female embryos rightfully attracts most of the attention of demographers, there is a 
need to assess relative roles of cohort size and abnormal SRB on the future marriage 
market.  
This note will review trends in female deficit at birth in Korea and use population 
projections to assess future imbalances at marriageable ages, separating the roles of 
SRB and cohorts size.  
 
 
2. Sex ratio at birth and changes in cohort size  
2.1 SRB 
In Korea, SRB started to increase regularly in the early 1980s, reaching above 110 in 
1986 (figure 1). Female deficit further accentuated, although very irregularly, to reach 
116.6 in 1990. Amid ups and downs, sex ratio averaged 115 in the first half of the 
1990s. A quick decline occurred in 1995-1997 and suddenly stalled. From then, SRB is 
quasi stable at a level of 110 or just under (108 in 2003). From 1995, authorities tried to 
limit the use of ultrasounds for sex selective abortions and there has been a growing 
awareness of the problems that could result from excessive sex imbalances for 
marriages of sons in the future.  
For the period 1980-2005, the number of males born exceeds females by 875,000 
(or an overall sex ratio of 110.5), with a normal sex ratio of 106, there would only be 
500,000 males in excess of females. This imbalance of births will be further decreased 
by excess male mortality, but migration could again reverse this. Korea has a long 
history of migration, with significant emigration from the Korea war until the 1990s. 
Then, return migration took place and was interrupted by the Asian Crisis that triggered 
a renewal of net emigration. Changes in gender aspects of migration cannot be easily Demographic Research: Volume 15, Article 3 
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forecasted, and so of their implications on the marriage market and dependency ratios, 
that will certainly be affected by son’s preference (Tuljapurkar et al.).  
 









































2.2 Cohort size 
Korea experienced important changes in the size of birth cohorts. First, there is the 
effect of the Korea war (1950-1953), the following recovery that also looks like a return 
to pre-transition fertility, the fertility transition from the early 1960s to 1983 when TFR 
reached 2.1 and immediately dropped under replacement with 1.76 in 1984 and 1.55 in 
1987. A brief rebound to 1.78 in the first half of the 1990s, incidentally coinciding with 
the peak in abnormal SRB, is followed by a slow decline to under 1.5 in 1998-2000. 
From 2002, a new drop leads Korean TFR to be among the lowest in the world with 
below 1.2 (1.16 in 2004).  
The age-pyramid of Korea at the 2000 census (figure 2) clearly shows these 
important variations in the size birth cohorts in the second half of the 20
th century, with 
the small cohorts of the Korea war (aged 45-49) the much larger post war cohorts (40-
44), a rather regular decline in the size of cohorts born during the fertility transition 
(aged 20-39) and a more pronounced decline for cohorts born in the 1980s (aged 10-19 Rallu: Female deficit and the marriage market in Korea 
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Figure 2:  Age pyramid of the Republic of Korea at census 2000 






















3. Sex ratios of the marriageable ages 
3.1 Methodology 
To measure the situation of the marriage market in the future, we use projections of the 
population of Korea by sex and single age until 2050 (website of the Statistical Office 
of the Republic of Korea). This projection includes a progressive return to normal SRB 
in 2020. Despite a levelling-off of SRB close to 110 in 1997-2003, the projection is still 
‘on track’. The projection is also close to trends projected by UN Population Division in 
World Population Prospects, the 2004 Revision. As regards migration included in the 
projection, an important topic given that it will affect the numbers of marriageable 
males and females, it cannot be directly measured. Changes in size of birth cohorts that 
we have calculated include both survival and migration. Migration affects cohorts 
already born as reflected by censuses until projection replaces observation. Female 
migration is slightly higher than male migration for observed as well as projected years 
(around 1.7% more females than males migrate). The stability of projected migration Demographic Research: Volume 15, Article 3 
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does not affect trends. It affects a little the ratio of marriageable males and females but 
there is no reason to change gender migration patterns. Shortage of females on the 
marriage market has no direct reason to influence migration, as a large part of migration 
occurs before marriage. Whenever migration could be a way of extending marriage 
opportunities, higher availability of male spouse in-country would not necessarily be a 
deterrent to accessing overseas marriage markets.  
Given the focus on female deficit, we calculate the ratio of females to males at 
various marriageable ages, not the traditional sex ratio but an inverse sex ratio. We 
consider ages 25-29 and a 10 years age-group 25-34 for males, the latter is just around 
the male mean age at marriage of 29.5 in 1995. Females are 3 years younger than 
males, which was the stable age difference between spouses in 1985-1995. To measure 
the role of cohort size alone, we calculated the same index (inverse sex ratio of 
marriageable ages) with constant SRB of 106 male births for 100 female births. 
Other method consisting to compare numbers of males and females weighted by 
first marriage rates (Tuljapurkar and al.) may be affected by changes in marriage 
patterns when strongly imbalanced marriageable cohorts of males and females will 
enter the scene, namely, late marriage of males may drop significantly as it will be 
difficult for older bachelors to find spouses. As marriage ages are more likely to 
concentrate at early marriageable ages for males and consistently also for females, 
results with 5 years age-group may be closer to the future situation of the marriage 
market than those with 10 years age-groups. However, as regards overall marriages, not 




3.2.1 Five-years age-groups 
Let us first consider ages 25-29 for males and 22-26 for females. There was a strong 
excess of females in the early 1980s, reaching 16%, when post war cohorts reached 
marriageable ages (figure 3a)
2. But, the late 1980s shows exactly the reverse situation 
with an 8% deficit of females, due to declining size of cohorts born during the fertility 
transition. A balanced situation in 1994 is followed by an even deeper deficit of females 
reaching 15% in 2001-2002. The new rebound around 2005 will be short by 2% of a 
balanced sex ratio of the marriageable ages. It is the last time that the marriage market 
is not affected by abnormal SRB. Thus, important sex imbalances are observed before 
abnormal SRB of the post 1985 period bears consequences on the marriage market. The 
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most severe female deficits of this century occur around 2010 and in 2025-2028 with 
respectively close to 23% and 24% less females than males. These troughs appear only 
partly due to abnormal SRB: females aged 22-26 in 2010 were born in 1984-1988 and 
the same ages in 2027 were born in 2001-2005 at a time when SRB is still mostly under 
or around 110. The difference between a normal SRB and the observed SRB shows 
that, at the bottom of the troughs, the latter is responsible for 3.5 percentage points of 
the 2010 trough and by 2.7 percentage points in 2026-2027. Actually, the peak of sex 
preference in the first half of the 1990s corresponds to a time when the age structure is 
favourable to men. A slight excess of females (3%) would even have been observed in 
2015-2017, but it is completely obliterated by the abnormal SRB and a 7% female 
deficit will take place instead. However, the situation is still more favourable for male 
cohorts of the peak sex preference than for younger and later cohorts. This is a chance 
that was probably not calculated, unless we assume some kind of unconscious prevision 
in humans. 
 
Figure 3a:  Observed and normal sex ratio at ages 25-29 with females/males age 







































3.2.2 Ten-years age-groups 
If we use 10-years age-groups: males 25-34 and females 22-31, the situation is much 
more regular, as could be expected because of larger age-groups (figure 3b). There is Demographic Research: Volume 15, Article 3 
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still a large excess of females in the first half of the 1980s (10%), and then female 
deficit increases in three steps until 2014-2015. From 5% in the first half of the 1990s, 
female deficit reaches 17% in the mid 2010s; it would have been only 12% with normal 
SRB. Sex preference thus appears responsible of an additional imbalance by 5 
percentage points. Then, cohorts born in 1990-1995 arrive on the marriage market. 
Unlike with 5-years age-groups, no excess of females appears around 2020 with normal 
SRB, nevertheless the sex ratio of marriageable ages in 2018 is not far from 
equilibrium: 0.96 in 2019. However, the observed SRB brings the figure down to 0.88. 
The largest female deficit is observed in 2026-2028 with sex ratio of 0.79, against only 
0.83 with normal SRB. Then, the projection includes cohorts that are not yet born and 
shows a reduced female deficit as SRB is projected to return to normal. 
 
Figure 3b:  Observed and normal sex ratio at ages 25-34 with females/males age 







































3.2.3 Changing ages at marriage 
We also calculated the sex ratio of a marriage market where age gap between males and 
females is only 2 years. When the 25-29 male and 23-27 female age-groups are 
considered, it is enough to compensate for abnormal sex ratios when deficit is highest: 
around 2010, and almost enough in 2026-2028, but it has no effect to restore the benefit 
of excess of females around 2015 and is even slightly less favourable than with a 3 Rallu: Female deficit and the marriage market in Korea 
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years age gap. When considering the 25-34 male and 23-32 female age-groups, female 
deficit due to observed SRB is compensated until 2012, but the first trough of female 
deficit is not totally compensated for and it has no effect during the period of improved 
sex ratios of the marriage market when the situation is about the same as with observed 
SRB. But, during the second trough, it nearly erases the effect of abnormal SRB.  
Going further, we calculated the sex ratio of a marriage market where males and 
females are of the same ages. This just reflects SRB and differential mortality until 
marriageable ages. As expected given that most of the imbalances are due to cohort 
size, the large variations consisting of peaks and troughs disappear and there is never 
excess of females. Female deficits is much more regular and much more manageable 
that the frequent reversals observed with age gaps of 3 or even 2 years, and it is never 
above 14% -, being reduced from its initial level of 15% in the 1990-1995 cohorts by 
excess male mortality of children and young adults. For the 10-years age-groups, 
female deficit is only slightly more important than with age gaps around 2020, when the 
size of cohorts would bring a relative reduction of imbalances. Obviously, given that 
the marriage market usually resolves its imbalances by changes in ages at marriage of 
both sexes in opposite directions, there will be a trend toward reduced age gap between 
spouses to ease constraints and the latter could well go below 2 years.  
A brief look at what has already happened around the turn of the century confirms 
this hypothesis. The age gap remained stable at 3.2 years in 1985-1994, in the frame of 
similar increases in average age at marriage for both sexes from 24.5 to 25.6 for 
females and 27.7 to 28.7 for males
3. But, from 1995 to 2001, the mean age at marriage 
increased faster for females than for males to respectively 28.3 and 30.7 years, reducing 
the age gap between spouses to 2.4 years. This move towards reduced age gaps between 
spouses is certainly not finished. So far, cohabitation is very low in Korea so that trends 
in ages at marriage translate well the adaptation of the marriage market. Despite a 
traditional society that makes cohabitation without marriage difficult, the important 
future imbalances on the marriage market could well lead to new form of unions with 
various consequences on SRB (see below). Mobs of bachelors turning to violence 
(Poston, Glover) (Hudson, Den Boer) or development of polyandry are not inevitable 
consequences of imbalances on the marriage market. Re-marriage, that may be 
statistically considered as a kind of substitute to polyandry (or polygamy), will probably 
increase following already existing trends. Whenever, the proportion of females in the 
population will decrease, it may not necessarily be detrimental to their socio-economic 
status as becoming rare usually increases value. 
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4. Conclusion and a catastrophic scenario 
Finally, in the case of Korea, abnormal SRB is very manageable, mostly due to an 
unexpected timing with a period of abundance of females on the marriage market. 
However, it will hinder marriage of males by close to 10%, obliterating a potentially 
favourable situation at ages 25-29 around 2015. But the trough of a 25% deficit of 
females already noted by Das Gupta and Li Shuzhuo (1997) is not mostly due to 
abnormal SRB. Adjustments of ages at marriage will certainly help ease the imbalances, 
and they have already started to do so. -  Imbalances on the marriage market could also 
eventually affect trends in migration, namely the currently higher female than male 
migration from Korea. For small populations like Korea, migration could be a solution 
to imbalances on the marriage market thru emigration of males, reduced migration of 
females or immigration of foreign females from neighbouring Asian countries and 
eventually of second and third generation female migrants from the US. But migration 
is not a solution in larger countries like China and India. 
Under the condition of a marriage market highly unfavourable to males, men who 
will delay their marriage will face a very tight situation. The number of males will be 
several folds that of females among the unmarried at ages 35 and above. Reduced age 
gaps between spouses will probably bring other important changes as regards gender 
roles and women’s empowerment that, in the frame of large imbalances (large 
availability of males) at late marriageable ages, may result in much more than age 
adjustments. The large choice of partners, not only for single women, but also for those 
who do not feel well in their current marriage, may have unexpected results. Let’s 
imagine a catastrophic scenario. Women are disappointed, but they already have a 
child, and he is a male. They nevertheless want to divorce and find easily another 
partner, who wants a male child, thus increasing again SRB. The spiral of abnormal 
SRB continues and the situation becomes less and less manageable. This seems not to 
be the direction taken in Korea, but other countries that did not yet reverse trends in 
SRB should consider it. In another scenario, gender roles change, because males 
understand they can easily lose their wives and because females understand a second 
husband is not necessarily better than the first one. Sex preference also declines, and we 
return to normal situation. 
 Rallu: Female deficit and the marriage market in Korea 
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